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YmTUAL CONSTITUTIONS:
THE CREATION OF RULES FOR
GOVERNING PRIVATE NETWORKS
Michael L Meyerson *

INTRODUCTION
Law always lags behind technology. In part, this is inevitable for a
profession based on precedent, where the common law still reigns after
nearly 500 years. Of course, the lawyers and judges who argue and
decide the issues of technology and law are also somewhat responsible;
legal education does not include basic engineering and electronics courses.
The result of this myopia has been a frequent misunderstanding of the
promise of new technology.
In 1915, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that movies were not
protected by the First Amendment, but were merely "spectacles, not to
be regarded. . . as part of the press of the country or as organs of public
opinion."\ Similarly, one court in 1968 held that cable television was not
sufficiently "affected with a public interest" to permit local regulation. 2
The court reasoned: "The public has about as much real need for the
services of a CATV system as it does for hand-carved ivory backscratchers. ,,3
In this age of high-speed computer networks, the nation's legal system
again seems unprepared. The rapid growth of computer technology has
left the law far behind. Computers and communications have been
improving at the extraordinary rate of 25 % a year for two decades. 4
Meanwhile, computing costs have been cut in half every three years since

* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., University of
PeIDlSylvania Law School; B.A., Hampshire College. An earlier version of this article was
presented at a conference on privaie compuier networks, sponsored by the Columbia Instituie
for Tele-Information. The author would like to thank Eli Noam for his encouragement and
thoughtlUlcommen~.

1. Mutual Films Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
This decision was not overturned until the middle of the century. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952).
2. Greaier Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ohio 1968), affd
sub nom., Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970).
3. 302 F. Supp. at 665.
4. Michael Dertouzous, Communications. Computers. and Networks, SCI. AM., Sept.
1991, at 63.
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1950. 5 What began not long ago as just another ivory back-scratcher has
suddenly become an omnipresent component of commercial and household
existence. Ready or not, a legal framework must, and will, be created to
respond to the introduction of computer networks into the fabric of
everyday life.
As the use of private networks grows, the need for rules governing
private networks will become increasingly acute. Questions of liability,
freedom and responsibility will be resolved, either based on wellconsidered policy or as a haphazard response to a sudden crisis.
There are three ways in which the behavior of networks might be
governed in the future. First, the United States Constitution could limit
those networks that are considered "governmental." Next, for those
networks characterized as non-governmental, legislatures and regulatory
bodies may decide to impose a wide range of requirements and responsibilities. Finally, efficiency, necessity and fears oflegalliability inevitably
will lead many networks to create and develop their own "constitutions,"
to promote the general welfare of their users.

1. WHAT MAKES A NETWORK "PRIVATE"?
The determination of whether networks are governed by constitutional
restrictions and how they should be regulated by the government cannot
be answered in the abstract. There are simply too many types of
networks. Further complicating the matter is the fact that, as the late
Ithiel de Sola Pool noted, "[n]etworks, like Russian dolls, can be nested
within each other.,,6
Deftning a network is like trying to hit a moving target. New forms
of networks are constantly being formed, in reaction to changes in
technology, regulation and experience. The simplest network is created
by linking together two computers. 7 A private corporation or university
can create its own network, linking together all of the computers used by
its employees.
Networks can also consist of services like CompuServe, Prodigy, and
America Online. 8 These privately owned networks can offer their

5. Lawrence Tesler, Networked Computing in the 1990s, SCI. AM., Sept. 1991, at 88.
6. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 199 (1983).
7. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ADVANCED NETWORK TECHNOLOGY 5

(1993).
8. See, e.g., Peter Lewis, Anarchy, A Threat on the Electronic Frontier, N.Y. TiMES,
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millions of subscribers a wide range of "products," such as electronic
mail, bulletin boards, news and games. Other networks, such as Usenet,
provide access to countless electronic fora for almost any conceivable
topic. 9
Finally, there are the "networks of networks," most notably the
Internet. 1O These "backbones" enable users to participate in thousands of
smaller networks.
A second factor complicating any constitutional analysis is the degree
to which a given network is "private." For purposes of this discussion,
a private network will be defmed as one which is restricted to authorized
members, as opposed to a "public" network which operates as a classic
common carrier, essentially accessible to all. Unfortunately, this
defmition of "private" (as perhaps would any defmition of "private")
leaves open many questions as to the "private" nature of a "private"
network. The three major sources of confusion concern the issues of: a)
whether a governmental entity owns or controls a network; b) whether the
actions of a non-governmental private network will be deemed to be
"state action"; and c) whether a non-governmental private network is
truly "private," in the sense of being able to select whom to exclude.
A. Ownership of the Network

The Constitution draws a sharp distinction between the actions of the
Government and those of the private sector. Whether the requirements
of free speech, equal protection and due process, for example, will have
to be obeyed will often tum on the ownership of a facility: is it owned
by a governmental entity or by non-governmental parties? The government will often be constrained by constitutional requirement~ that do not
apply when the government is not involved. A public (governmental)
school library, for instance, will have far less discretion regarding
decisions as to which books to discard than would a private (nongovernmental) school library. 11

May 11, 1994, at DI.
9. See MARK GIBBS & RICHARD SMITIl, NAVIGATING TIlE INTERNET 194 (1993).
10. See TRAcy LAQUEEY, THE INTERNET COMPANION 1 (1993) ("The Internet is a loose
amalgam of thousands of computer networks reaching millions of people all over the
world.").
11. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment limits the discretion of a public school board
to remove books from a school library).
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Not all governmental facilities, though, are treated as public fora for
open discussion. Governmental entities have been permitted to close off
certain communication facilities to the public. For example, a public
school can limit an interschool mail system to union messages, while
excluding mail from a rival union. 12 As the Supreme Court stated, in
another context, the "State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it
is lawfully dedicated. "13
Nevertheless, the freedom of government to control its own property
is limited. While the federal government can decide which charities are
permitted to participate in a fund-raising drive among federal workers, it
may not bar a charity due to "a bias against the viewpoint advanced by
the excluded speakers. "14 Thus, even when the government acts in a
"private" capacity, it is still limited by the Constitution. Because it is not
a public forum, though, speakers can be excluded on viewpoint-neutral
criteria.
It is evident, then, that a publicly-owned network can still be regarded
as "private," if access to the network is limited and restricted. Such a
government-owned, private network would still face the constitutional
restriction against viewpoint-based discrimination, but would otherwise
have generally the same discretion to control the content of speech as
would a privately-owned private network. Conversely, a privately-owned
network, such as AT&T or Bell Atlantic, can be considered a "public
network," if it is open to all potential users. The general requirement of
non-discriminatory access of a common carrier would regulate such a
non-governmental public network.
Most networks will not fit these two categories. It will, perhaps, be
easiest to think of a continuum between the exclusively private and the
truly public. The vast majority of legal controversies will arise with the
networks which are somewhere in the middle of this spectrum, used by
more than just one entity (governmental or corporate), yet not generally
viewed as common carriers. It is these privately-owned "private
networks" that pose the newest, and perhaps most difficult, questions
regarding the appropriate scope of limitations, if any, that should be
imposed on network owners.

12. Peny Educ. Ass'n v. Peny Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
13. AdderIy v. State of Fla., 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
14. Cornelius v. N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812
(1985).

No.1]

Virtual Constitutions

133

B. State Action

Further complicating this question is the concept of "state action,"
whereby certain actions of a non-governmental party are attributable to
the government, and hence governed by constitutional mandates. If a
private network were held to be a "state actor," its discretion over how
to deal with users would be significantly restricted. 15 The most relevant
constitutional provisions would likely be the First Amendment guarantee
of freedom of expression, which generally prohibits content-based
censorship, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection, and
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections against loss of liberty
and property without due process oflaw. The need for a theory of "state
action" is based on the fact that the Constitution was only designed to
restrict governmental behavior. Private parties are governed by laws
passed by Congress or by state legislatures, but the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment only apply to the government. Thus, a mob
which prevents you from giving a speech has not violated your First
Amendment rights. A police officer who wrongfully pulls you off a
podium, however, is an agent of the city and would be guilty of violating
your constitutional rights.
The resolution of a state action questions depends on whether the
relationship between the government and a private party is such that the
actions of the ostensibly private actor should be attributed to the state.
For example, a non-governmental school can discriminate on the basis of
race without violating the Constitution. 16 However, if a city permits such

15. The Court faced a somewhat similar inquiry in trying to detennine whether broadcast
licensees were state actors. There was no majority opinion, but Chief Justice Burger wrote
for a three-justice plurality that a finding of state action would destroy broadcast journalism:
[I)t would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name of promoting the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, that the day-to-day editorial
decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind of restraints urged
by respondents. . . . Journalistic discretion would in many ways be lost to
the rigid limitations that the First Amendment imposes on Government.
Application of such standards to broadcast licensees would be antithetical
to the very ideal of vigorous, challenging debate on issues of public interest.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-21
(1973) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). By contrast, in the case of a common carrier, such
as the post office or cable television as a provider of public and leased access, such
constitutional standards would actually encourage free debate by enabling more speech.
16. Such a private school may still be subject to statutory and regulatory limitations. Cf
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding IRS denial of tax-
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a discriminatory school to have "exclusive" use of municipal recreational
facilities, such use would "significantly enhanceD the attractiveness of
segregated private schools," and thereby violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17
The state action issue for a particular privately-owned network will
depend on a variety of factors. The relationship between such networks
and the government is not only quite complex, it varies for different types
of networks. The High Performance Computing Act of 1991 has further
interwoven the Government and private sector. IS In the Act, Congress
established a super-network, the National Research and Education
Network ("NREN"), to provide a "test bed" for the next generation of
high-speed computer networks. 19
It is not apparent how NREN will relate to the private sector. 20 The
law specifies that NREN not be a competitor of private enterprises but
instead should be "designed, developed, and operated in a manner which
fosters and maintains competition and private sector investment in highspeed data networking within the telecommunications industry. ,,21 On the
other hand, it is not clear whether there will be any private competitors
for NREN.
By definition, everything NREN does is "state action" since it is
governmentally created and controlled. The status of both the users of
NREN and any super-networks that may duplicate NREN's services is far
from clear. A changing technical environment makes predictions of legal
conclusions speculative for the simplest legal issues.

exempt status to discriminatory private schools).
17. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 569 (1974).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5512 (1993). For an excellent summary of the Act, see
Information Superhighway Bill Sketches Outlines of Ubiquitous Computer Network, Daily
Report for Executives (BNA), at Cl (Nov. 26, 1991).
19. See generally Andy Reinhardt, Building the Data Highway, BYTE, Mar. 1994, at 46.
NREN will be built on an existing network, "NSFNET,» which is run by the National
Science Foundation. NSFNET is also the major backbone of the Internet. While only five
percent of Internet's costs are paid for out of the federal treasury, a much larger federal
outlay seems dedicated to NREN. Over the first five years of its existence, federal funding
may grow to one billion dollars per year. The actual operating structure of NREN is not
mandated by the law which established it. Control over NREN is centered in the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, which will coordinate the involvement of many other federal
agencies. Other agencies include the Department of Defense, the National Science
Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Departments of Education and Energy, and the National Institute of
Science and Technology. Steve Higgins, Senate Ponders $1.15B Proposal, PC WEEK, Aug.
17, 1992, at 39.
20. Reinhardt, supra note 19, at 46.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(3) (1993).
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Unfortunately, the state action doctrine is a labyrinth of competing
policies and analyses. Its complexities have led one scholar to conclude,
"[V]iewed doctrinally, the state action cases are a 'conceptual disaster
area.' "22
Courts have held in one line of cases that only governmental coercion
or encouragement of a specific private act will lead to a finding of state
action: "Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private
party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those
initiatives . . . ."23

In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that a private electric utility's
termination of service to a customer was not state action even though the
Pennsylvania Utilities Commission ("P.U.C.") had approved the general
tariff containing the termination procedures. 24 The Court explained that
neither the existence of "extensive and detailed" regulation nor the
P.U.C.'s approval of a general tariff would turn a private utility's acts
into actions of the state.2S The Court noted that the P.U.C. had never
discussed the specific provision and that "there was no . . . imprimatur
placed on the practice. "26 The Court did note that:
It may well be that acts of a heavily regulated utility with at
least something of a governmentally protected monopoly will
more readily be found to be "state" acts than will the acts
of an entity lacking these characteristics. But the inquiry
must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself.27

22. LAURENCEH. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1690 (2ded., 1988)(quoting
Charles Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action, n Equal
Protection, and California'S Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967).
23. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982).
24. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
25. [d. at 350.
26. [d. at 357.
27. [d. at 350-51. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court held that a private club could
discriminate against African-Americans even though it received one of only a limited number
of liquor licenses from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, and was subject to detailed
regulation. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Because the discriminatory
policy was not mandated by the Board, the Court held that the State's general regulation
"cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage racial discrimination. Nor can it be said
to make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer in the club's
enterprise." [d. at 176-77.
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Heavy state funding may not even be enough to turn an enterprise
public. A private school which taught special-needs students and received
more than 90 % of its funding from the state was permitted to fire an
employee for speaking out against school policies, even though such a
firing might have been unconstitutional had the employer been a public
school. 28 The Court reasoned that the school's fiscal relationship with the
State should be analogized to that of independent contractors performing
services for pay, and thus should not result in a fmding of state action. 29
Under the reasoning of these cases, the vast majority of non-governmental private networks using NREN would maintain their private
character unless their actions were either compelled by the federal
government or induced by governmental encouragement. Governmental
regulation and benefits received by the private networks would not turn
otherwise private decisions into state action.
However, such an analysis may understate the unique advantage given
to certain private networks by the Government. That special benefit,
combined with an intermingling of governmental and private facilities,
may be enough to support a finding of state action for at least some nongovernmental private networks.
A series of Supreme Court cases have stressed that, even without the
government mandating or coercing activity, state action will be found
when an intertwining between the private and public entities indicates that
the government, "has elected to place its power, property and prestige"
behind a challenged private act. 30
For example, the Supreme Court held that a "private" restaurant,
located in a municipal building, violated the Constitution by its racially
discriminatory pOlicies. 31 The Court based its finding that the restaurant's
actions were "state action" on a number of factors, including the fact that
under the lease agreement, the city benefited fmancially from the
economic effects of the private discrimination. 32 The Court concluded

28. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
29. [d. at 843.
30. Edmonson y. LeesyilJe Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding use of
peremptory challenge by private civil litigant to exclude jurors based on race was state
action).
31. Burton Y. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
32. [d. at 724 (stating that "profits earned by discrimination not only contribute to, but
are indispensable elements in, the financial success of a governmental agency"). The Court
also noted that the land and building were publicly owned, that the building was "dedicated
to 'public uses' in performance of the Authority's 'essential governmental functions,'" and
that the restaurant was a "physically and financially integral and indeed indispensable part, "
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that the local government had neglected its constitutional duties by failing
to limit contractually the restaurant's discriminatory practices:
[By] its inaction, the [government] has not only made itself
a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its
power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. 33
Like the restaurant in a public building, networks using NREN will be
physically (or metaphysically) intertwined. Depending on the business
relationship, the Federal government might well benefit fmancially from
the actions of the "private" network. If such a network misuses its
power, by, for example, banishing critics based on the content of their
speech, it could be argued that the Government is putting its power,
computing and otherwise, behind the misconduct. If so, the private
network's actions might be characterized as state action.
A similar concern led the Court to strike down restrictive covenants
which barred the sale of homes to "nonwhites. ,,34 Even though the
covenants were contained in contracts between private parties, the Court
held that judicial enforcement of those contracts would be unconstitutional. The Court concluded: "It is clear that but for the active intervention
of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power,
petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question
without restraint. ,,35
Although the actual covenant did not emanate from the state, and there
was no evidence that the government encouraged the discrimination, state
action existed because the government was facilitating the discrimination.
Likewise, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Supreme Court,
stated that peremptory challenges of jurors by private civil litigants were
state action because of the "overt, significant assistance," of state officials
in the discrimination:

of the government's plan to operate as a self-sustaining unit. [d. at 723-24.
33. [d. at 725.
34. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
35. [d. at 19. According to the Court, the state had "made available to [private]
individuals the full coercive power of government" to deny buyers, on the basis of race,
their right to purchase property. [d.
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Without the direct and indispensable participation of the
judge, who beyond all question is a state actor, the peremptory challenge system would serve no purpose. By enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the court, 'has
not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has
elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the
[alleged] discrimination. ,36
It could be argued as well that the federal government's infrastructure
is essential for the larger, more powerful networks. A super-network,
such as the NREN, provides "overt, significant assistance" which
undoubtedly enables "private" networks to become economically viable.
Thus, the government may fmd itself a party to challenged acts of such
networks, even without active encouragement.
Certain private networks might also be analogized to company towns.
The Supreme Court held that even though the streets of a town were
privately owned, the First Amendment permitted Jehovah's Witnesses to
leaflet on those streets, because: "Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical
interest in the functioning of the community in such a manner that the
channels of communication remain free. ,,37 In language that could easily
be applied to private network users, the Court stated that:
[The residents of company towns] are free citizens of their
State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make
decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation.
To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to
enable them to be properly informed their information must
be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these
people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these
freedoms with respect to any other citizen. 38
The reach of the company town concept was severely restricted when
the Court held that there was no First Amendment right to petition in

36. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991).
37. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
3S. ld. at 50S-509.
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private shopping centers, and distinguished the company town because,
unlike the shopping center, it had "all of the attributes of a state-created
municipality. "39 Nevertheless, as networks develop, courts may find that
they are far more essential for meaningful communication than shopping
centers. Networks might carry all forms of electronic communication,
and deprivation of access to a network might indeed impair the flow of
public information.
For smaller networks, it is unlikely that state-action will be an issue.
Such networks appear to be fungible, so that if one network is unsatisfactory, others are available. No single network is essential. However, if
a bottleneck arises, whereby one or only a few entities control access, this
issue will become far more significant. If a court fmds that a private
network has "monopoly power, via economic, physical or natural means,
or via essential facilities, ,,40 that court might be far more willing to
conclude that the network's actions are state action. As such, the
constitutional mandates in favor of freedom of expression and against
censorship and discrimination would govern the largest private networks'
decisions.
C. How Private is Private?
Another major source of confusion over the term "private" can be
seen in the concept of a "private" club. Normally, the First Amendment
permits individuals to select those persons with whom they will and will
not associate. 41 For instance, one court has held that parade organizers
have a constitutional right to bar others from marching in their parade,
and that the government would violate the First Amendment if it tried to
force them to permit others to march.42 On the other hand, a so-called
"private" club can be prevented from discriminating in its choice of

39. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507 (1976).
40. Allen S. Hammond, Regulating Broadband Communications Networks, 9 YALE J. ON
REG. 181, 234 (1992).
41. See, e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
548 (1987) (describing the "right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious and cultural ends").
42. See New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp.
358 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (permitting long-standing sponsor of St. Patrick's Day parade to
exclude the Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization). But see Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston Allied War Veterans Council, 636 N.E.2d 1293
(Mass. 1994) (fmding such exclusion would violate the First Amendment).
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membership when it is large enough to resemble a place of public
accommodation. For example, it is constitutional for the government to
outlaw discrimination based on race, creed or sex in any club with more
than 400 members that provides regular meal service. 43 As Justice
O'Connor has observed, while an organization devoted solely to political
or religious activity may have full constitutional protection against
governmental interference, "there is only minimal constitutional protection
of the freedom of commercial association. "44
Thus, the government may be able to regulate access to a "private"
network, if it involves only commercial association, especially if multiple
firms are involved, or is so large that it loses any plausible claim of
intimacy and homogeneity.
In sum, the "private" nature of a "private network" will not be
resolved until we know the structure of the network system that is
ultimately created and the path of analysis that is ultimately chosen by the
Supreme Court. Until then, one hopes that the courts will strive to locate
that narrow pathway that both limits governmental interference and
prevents private monopolistic abuses.

II. WHOSE SPEECH IS IT ANYWAY?
When a network owner establishes a forum for the speech of network
users-by creating bulletin boards, for example-wrangling frequently
exists over two issues: who has the right to determine what speech is
communicated and who is responsible for illegal speech. Without
question, no party should ever be held legally responsible for speech
which it had no power to prevent. 4S The harder question comes when a
network owner tries to retain the right to bar speech it fmds undesirable.
The legal and policy problems are exacerbated when the network owner
is unwilling or, for large networks, unable to preview and evaluate all of
the speech on the network.
As an initial matter, network owners do have a right to define how
their networks will be used. There is no sound reason to prevent a
company from establishing a "family" network if there are other networks
freely available. Many different types of networks would seem to further,

43. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
44. Robens v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
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not deter, free expression. A danger of hypocrisy seeps in, however, if
corporate criticism is censored as if it were equivalent to sexually
offensive material. Confusion, if not charges of false advertising, will
also await a network that leads users to view bulletin boards as open fora,
without ensuring that all know that the network considers all speech as
"its" speech. Ultimately, though, the issue may be decided not on the
basis of public or corporate policy, but by legal rules that determine who
should be held responsible for network speech.
The frrst judicial decision regarding a computer network's liability for
the communications of its users came on October 29, 1991, in Cubby,
Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. 46 CompuServe is a network that provides its
subscribers with access to numerous information sources, including more
than 150 "forums," such as electronic bulletin boards, on-line conferences
and databases. One forum, the Journalism Forum, is operated by
Cameron Communications, Inc. ("CCI"). CCI had a contract with
CompuServe under which CCI "agree[d] to manage, review, create,
delete, edit and otherwise control the content of the [Journalism Forum],
in accordance with editorial and technical standards and conventions of
style as established by CompuServe. ,,47 CCI, in turn, had contracts with
many electronic publishers, including Don Fitzpatrick Associates
("DFA"), which publishes Rumorville. DFA's contract required it to
"maintain ... files in a timely fashion," and stated that "DFA accept[ed]
total responsibility for the contents of [Rumorville]. ,,48
On more than one occasion in April 1991, Rumorville published
unflattering statements about a competing service, Skuttlebut. The owners
of Skuttlebut sued for libel, business disparagement and unfair competition. What distinguished this from the usual legal dispute was that they
not only sued the head of DFA, which produced the material, but also
sued CompuServe, which carried it. The key issue, according to the
court, was to decide which print model should be applied to computer
networks. At common law, anyone who repeated or republished
defamatory information was as guilty as the original speaker. 49 Thus, if
Anne said that Bob was a thief, and Carol's newspaper printed the
charge, Bob could sue Carol for repeating the allegation.

46.
47.
48.
49.

776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
1d. at 143.
1d.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).
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Booksellers and newsstand operators, though, are not generally
characterized as "repeaters" unless they knew, or should have known of
the defamatory content. so Thus, if David sells Carol's newspaper at his
stand, David is immune from liability as long as he is unaware of the
defamation. The reason for this exemption is obvious. To make
booksellers and newsstand operators liable for everything they sell is to
require them to be aware of everything they sell. As the Supreme Court
has stated, "It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an
If the contents of bookshops and
approach to omniscience. . ..
periodical stands were restricted to material of which their proprietors had
made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed. "SI
The court in Cubby ruled that CompuServe should be viewed as an
electronic newsstand rather than a high-tech newspaper. The court
reasoned that CompuServe "has no more editorial control over such a
publication [as Rumorville] than does a public library, book store or
newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine
every publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it
would be for any other distributor to do so. "S2 Accordingly, even though
CompuServe could refuse to carry a particular forum or publication within
a forum, "in reality, once it does decide to carry a publication, it will
have little or no editorial control over that publication's contents. "S3 The
legal result of the newsstand analogy is that CompuServe would be liable
only if it "knew or had reason to know" of the statements. S4 Because no
such knowledge could be proven or implied, CompuServe escaped
liability on all counts.
Of course, if the network is not responsible for the publication, the
focus will shift to the party who actually created the allegedly harmful
material. ss Such a ruling serves the interest of free communication. If
networks are not held legally responsible for their users' communications
networks will not have the same incentive to seek to control and censor
such communications on the network. The court's decision thus helps to

50. E.g., Lennan v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
51. Smilh v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
52. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
53. ld.
54. ld. at 141.
55. As of Ihis date, Ihere has been no resolution on Ihe merits of Skuttlebut's charges
against Rumorville.
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reduce the potential problems of censorship by electronic publishers,
while maintaining individual responsibility for one's own remarks.
Unfortunately, network owners and users may find that the court's
decision does not go far enough to protect freedom of electronic speech.
This dilemma is illustrated by the crisis that confronted another network,
Prodigy, which is a joint venture of Sears, Roebuck & Co. and I.B.M.
Prodigy offers its more than one million subscribers access to numerous
services, including over 100 electronic billboards. In mid-1991, one of
the billboards began displaying vicious anti-Semitic messages, including
statements that stories about the Holocaust were "a hoax," and that the
extermination of Jews was "good idea. ,,56 The Anti-Defamation League
of the B 'nai B'rith (" ADL") complained to Prodigy and asked them to
censor the offending items. At first, Prodigy refused, citing its policy of
permitting free exchange on its bulletin boards.
Many found this argument insufficient. Prodigy, after all, had
previously censored statements of which it disapproved. Prodigy had, in
fact, advertised itself as a "family-oriented" service, and vowed to screen
messages both electronically and with a five-person back-up crew that
would remove any "offensive" statements that slipped through.57
Previously, Prodigy had removed not only statements of an explicitly
sexual nature, but also comments criticizing Prodigy for its actions.
Apparently, the censors at Prodigy felt that corporate criticism was
"offensive. "
Given this background, Prodigy's acquiescence towards hate speech
could easily appear as approval. Prodigy both retained the ability to
delete messages which it felt were offensive and permitted the anti-Semitic
tirades to continue. Therefore, the chairman and the director of the ADL
concluded "that Prodigy did not regard [the anti-Semitic messages] as
offensive. However, we did. "58 Finally, Prodigy relented, and announced
that" offensiveness" included statements "grossly repugnant to community
standards," including, presumably, those of bigots.59
The Prodigy incident reveals the weakness in the Cubby decision's
protection for networks. As long as a network retains the power to

56. Barnaby J. Feder, Toward Defining Free Speech in the Computer Age, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1991, at E5.
57. ld.
58. Melvin Salberg & Abraham H. Foxman, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1991, at A30.
59. Feder, supra note 56, at E5.

144

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 8

censor, it risks being treated, both legally and in the world of public
opinion, as an electronic editor who concurs with all statements on the
network. Since CompuServe only avoided liability because it was
ignorant of the message, it presumably would have been responsible for
any repetition of the message once it received a complaint. Its refusal to
censor a statement would then be viewed as an adoption of the statement
as its own. Moreover, once a network is informed of a problematic
statement somewhere in its system, it might well be said that the network
has "reason to know" of the possibility of future similar statements and
thus should monitor the offending speaker.
Such a rule would pose a grave threat to the free exchange of ideas on
private networks. Owners would have to evaluate every communication
about which they had received a complaint. This problem is not limited
to libel. Allegations of invasion of privacy, copyright violations and even
obscenity would force the network owners to use their power of
censorship.
To make matters worse, the determination of what is constitutionally
protected speech and what is illegal speech can be a difficult and
uncertain legal decision. Risk-averse network owners will undoubtedly
"steer far wider of the unlawful zone,» in keeping out questionable
speech. 60 Since the speech being silenced will not originate with the
network operator, the desire to communicate one's own thoughts, which
can counteract the chilling effect of restrictions on speech, will not deter
network self-censorship.
In defending its right to censor offensive material, Prodigy stated that
it had, by "using its editorial discretion, chosen not to publish . . .
submissions and other similar material. . .. The First Amendment
protects private publishers, like the New York Times and Prodigy, from
Government interference in what we publish. »61 However, any network
owner will eventually realize the impossibility of trying to censor all
potentially damaging speech. Prodigy, for example, not only pre-screens
messages, but also utilizes software to catch numerous expletives and
otherwise offensive words and phrases. 62 Nonetheless, in early 1993 a

60. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 275 (1964)(citing Speiserv. Randall. 357
U.S. 513. 526 (1960».
61. Geoffrey Moore. The First Amendment is Safe at Prodigy. N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 16.
1990. at C3.
62. Sandra Sugawara. Computer Networks and the First Amendment. WASH. POST. Oct.
16. 1991. at A12.
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Prodigy bulletin-board user was sued for libel and securities fraud for
publishing negative statements about a small company in which he had
invested and lost money. 63 The company did not sue Prodigy, but could
it have? If a court took Prodigy at its word, then the offending comments
were published as a result of Prodigy's editorial discretion and, like any
private publisher, Prodigy should be held accountable for abuse of that
discretion. However, this fmding, combined with the impossibility of
censoring all network speech, would quickly cause the end of bulletin
boards and other network fora.
There are two solutions to this dilemma. Congress could pass a law,
which would clarify the rule in Cubby and free network owners from
legal responsibility for any programming they did not produce, unless
they had notice of actual illegality. In other words, there would be no
network liability for user speech until a court had found the speech to be
beyond the protection of the First Amendment. Thus, the determination
of the legality of the speech would be made by an impartial court, rather
than a private network, while the party who produced the speech would
bear the same responsibility as it would in a more traditional medium.
The most obvious weakness to this proposal is that legislative action is
difficult to obtain, especially if lawmakers would have to resist the call
for greater censorship of unpopular speech.
One hopes that wise judges will make a similar ruling in the course of
deciding litigation, but legal uncertainty will persist until such cases are
decided. Also, networks like Prodigy that choose to retain the power to
exclude messages which they fmd offensive may still be in legal limbo.
It will not always be easy to discern the line between producing a
message, which creates legal responsibility for the speech, and merely
acquiescing in speech when one has the power to prevent it.
The alternate solution, which may require nothing more than a
published policy, is for a network to forego all ability to censor communications in exchange for freedom from liability for the communications of
others. One example of such a trade-off can be seen in cases freeing
broadcasters from liability for programming they are required to carry.
Federal law deprives a broadcaster of all "power of censorship" over
material required to be broadcast under the "equal opportunities" law. 64

63. Amy Harmon, New Legal Frontier, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at At.
64. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988) states that if a broadcast licensee permits a candidate for
public office to use the station, equal opportunities to use the station must be made available
to all competing candidates.
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The Supreme Court ruled that this requirement implies absolute protection
for broadcasters against state-imposed liability for the material carried. 65
As one court noted in relieving a radio talk-show host of legal responsibility for statements made by an anonymous caller: "The impact of the
censorship [if liability was imposed] would not fall upon the broadcaster's
words and ideas; instead, it would be applied to the opinions and ideas of
those members of the public who elected to participate in this kind of
public forum. ,,66
To avoid repeated litigation and network reviews of all information
carried on billboard statements, e-mail, video programs and more,
networks may be willing to agree to carry messages without regard to
their content. Thus, these networks will be more like public parks, or at
least common carriers, than similar private publications. Such an
arrangement might be voluntary. To avoid legal uncertainty, however,
the choice probably should be embodied in legislation. This would
replace one editor with thousands, and multiply the electronic voices
heard. To paraphrase the Supreme Court, such freedom for networks
from liability would help prevent the danger of shutting off "an important
outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do
not themselves" control computer networks "who wish to exercise their
freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press. ,,67
A useful, if surprising, analogy can be made between this vision of
modem private networks and the role of printers in colonial America. In
those days, because printing was still an art that was both expensive and
not widely mastered, printers performed a vitally different function than
they do today. Like many contemporary networks, printers viewed their
job largely as that of preparing the writings of others for mass distribution. Printers, therefore, would publish diverse points of view, and often
received criticism for their willingness to publish undesirable material. 68
In the 1730s, Benjamin Franklin was an influential Pennsylvania printer.
On June 10, 1731, after enduring complaints about the writing he had
printed, Franklin wrote his own defense, entitled "An Apology for
Printers." He argued that printers should be not be treated as proponents
of all that they publish:

65. Fanners Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
66. Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 557 (Wyo. 1976).
67. N.Y. Times Co. v. SuJIivan, 367 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
68. See, e.g., POOL, supra note 6, at 16 ("The printing press was a bottleneck where
copies could be examined and controlled.").
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[Printers] chearfully serve all contending Writers that pay
them well, without regard on which side they are of the
Question in Dispute. . .. Being thus continually emloy'd
in serving both Parties, Printers naturally acquire a vast
Unconcernedness as to the right or wrong Opinions contain'd in what they print; regarding it only as the Matter of
their daily labour: They print things full of Spleen and
Animosity, with the utmost Calmness and Indifference, and
without the least Ill-will to the Persons reflected on . . . .69
Franklin continued that printers should not be regarded as approving
that which they print, and then warned of the consequences of condemning printers for the work of the writers:
It is . . . unreasonable what some assert, "That Printers
ought not to print any Thing but what they approve;" since
if all of that Business should make such a Resolution, and
abide by it, an End would thereby be put to Free Writing,
and the World would afterwards have nothing to read but
what happen'd to be the Opinion of Printers . . . .70

The printers of the eighteenth century controlled access to the primary
means of mass communication then available. 71 Private censorship by
those printers would have resulted in a severe restriction on public debate.
The largest networks may be in a similar situation at the conclusion of the
twentieth century. It may be even more unreasonable for these networks,
which carry millions of messages, to carry only those they approve. If
such a situation occurs, "an End would thereby be put to Free [Electronic
Communication] and the World would afterwards have nothing to read but
what happen'd to be the Opinion of the [Network owners]."

69. Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for Printers, PENN. GAZETTE, June 10, 1731,
reprinted in LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 4-5
(1966). Franklin, never one to hold himself to too high a standard, freely admitted that he
had often refused to print material that would "countenance Vice, or promote Immorality
... [or] as might do real InjuI)' to any Person .... " ld.
70. ld at 6.
71. See, e.g., POOL, supra note 6, at 16.

148

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 8

III. PRIVATE NETWORK CONSTITUTIONS
A. General Discussion: The Purpose of a Constitution
To a nation, a constitution serves many different functions. On its
most practical level, a constitution describes the ways in which those in
political control may exercise their power. Next, a constitution can
provide the framework for the rights of the individuals living within the
country. It can delineate the line between public responsibility and
private autonomy. Ultimately, though, a constitution defmes the very
character of a nation, directing what sort of country it wants to be, and
is likely to become.
In many ways, constitutions for computer networks will operate in the
same way. They will delineate the decision-making functions, outline the
rights of network users, and both reflect and create a vision of what type
of society we want within, and without, the universe of the network.
Assuming requirements are not imposed either by the courts or by the
federal and local legislatures, networks will need to create their own.
Because of the variety of private networks, it is impossible to create any
one-size-fits-all document.
Certain fundamental principles can be
ascertained, however, based on the current state of and future plans for
private networks, coupled with a look at the basic principles of a free
society.
One of the more overlooked aspects in current discussions of
broadband networks is that a new technology does not always require new
rules. Just as it is an invasion of privacy to read someone's Post Officedelivered mail, it is an invasion of privacy to read his or her e-mail
without permission. Just as a fast-food restaurant can prevent employees
from receiving personal phone calls at work, an employer can prevent
employees from using a company network for personal affairs.
Thus, some of the questions involving the next generation of private
networks were answered long before there was a Silicon Valley. If a
network is small-for example, an entirely in-house operation-there
seems to be no logical reason why the network should be viewed any
differently from traditional workplace equipment. If an employer wants
to limit the access of certain employees to parts of the network, he or she
should be able to do so. Newsday, concerned that its reporters were
spending too much company time on e-mail, decided to alter its computer
software to keep reporters from sending e-mail messages. Reporters were
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only able to receive messages, but their editors continued to be able to
send e-mail. 72 This may be a demeaning way to treat one's staff, but
restricting reporters in this fashion is not analytically dissimilar from
issuing a memo telling staff not to use copiers for personal items.
New thinking may be necessary when the technology poses new risks
or creates novel opportunities. For example, if an ever-increasing amount
of personal information is carried over networks, the threat to personal
privacy also increases. Moreover, if it is easier to tap into a computerized database than the files inside a doctor's office, greater precautions
are needed.
Privacy must be protected. There is both an economic value in private
information (as evidenced by the sale of mailing lists) and a First
Amendment interest in the dissemination of truthful information.
Nonetheless, there is an overriding interest, both personal and societal,
that a private citizen retain the ability to ensure that his or her private
communications will not be subject to electronic intrusion. The growth
of computer networks creates new threats to what has been termed "the
right most valued" by civilized persons, "the right to be let alone. »73
Networks must either ensure privacy or effectively inform all users
that their communications are not private. Any contractual agreement
permitting a network owner, or some other entity, to gather or disseminate personal information should be a knowing waiver. No "negative
option," whereby a user waives privacy protection without affirmatively
requesting it, should be permitted. As a matter of general principle, users
should not be charged extra for routine privacy protection.74
For those networks that include numerous participants, privacy must
be guaranteed even further. Absent a significant threat to the network's
viability or purpose, the right to send a message privately must be
preserved. Encryption should be permitted. Each disseminator of
information should have the right and ability to control who receives his
or her messages.
The battle over encryption is not merely one between a network owner
and its users. The United States Government, concerned that encryption

72. Lee Sproull & Sara Kiesler, Computers, Networks and Work, SCI. AM., Sept. 1991,
at 116, 119.
73. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74. COMMON CARRIER WEEK, Aug. 10, 1992 (discussing testimony of Marc Rotenberg,
head of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, at forum conducted by the
National Commission on Libraries and Information Science).
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may threaten national security, proposed a system which would have
effectively made any encrypted message "decodeable" by the National
Security Agency. This proposal, which would have limited the ability to
guarantee the privacy of one's electronic communications, was withdrawn
in July 1994.75
B. Example: Anti-Competitiveness
One area where individual autonomy may conflict with the public
interest involves anti-competitive behavior. The desire to enhance one's
own economic standing at the expense of one's competitors may lead to
inappropriate, if not illegal, use of the private network. The danger of
anti-competitive behavior increases, as does the likelihood of antitrust law
violation, where multiple large firms use a network to the exclusion or
detriment of their competitors.
The antitrust laws view joint anti-competitive activity far more
critically than unilateral anti-competitive action. The Supreme Court has
held that concerted conduct violates the law if it merely restrains trade,
while individual firm conduct is illegal only if it threatens monopolization. 76 In other words, an "unreasonable" restraint of trade may be
permissible if imposed by a single firm, but not by two firms acting
jointly.
In one of the first cases involving computer networks, airline computer
reservation systems ("CRS") were held not to violate the antitrust laws. 77
In this case, American Airlines and United Airlines had each created their
own CRS ("SABRE" for American and "Apollo" for United). Each had
charged competing airlines a substantial fee for any of their flights booked
through the system. 78 The court found the arrangement legal because the
CRS neither eliminated nor threatened to eliminate competition in the air

75. See, e.g., Elizabeth Corcoran & John Mintz, Administration Steps Back on Computer
Surveillance, WASH. POST, July 21, 1994, at AI.
76. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774-77 (1984). In
particular, Section 1 of the Shennan Antitrust Act bars combinations in "restraint of trade, "
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), while Section 2 prohibits any "attempt to monopolize." 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1994).
77. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), affg In
re Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal.
1988).
78. The Department of Transportation requires each CRS owner to charge its airline
customers a uniform rate. 14 C.F.R. § 255.5(a) (1992). In 1991, American Airlines charged
$1.75 per booking.
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transport market. Moreover, each CRS was not treated as an "essential
facility" because it was created by a single firm: "A facility that is
controlled by a single firm will be considered 'essential' only if control
of the facility carries with it the power to eliminate competition in the
downstream market. ,,79
Such uriilateral power is not often found by courts. Only in extreme
cases, such as the only local producer of electrical power refusing to sell
to wholesalers in order to eliminate competition in the retail market, will
there be the ability to eliminate competition. 80
In the early 1980s, AT&T was found to have misused its control over
an essential facility by refusing to allow MCI to interconnect with its local
distribution facilities. 81 The court described four factors that determine
if there is an antitrust violation by the unilateral owner of an "essential
facility": a) It is controlled by a monopolist; b) there is a practical
inability to duplicate facilities; c) the use of the facility to a competitor
has been denied; and d) it would be feasible to permit use of the facility. 82
Another court has stated that a fmding of "essential facility" requires a
showing that "severe handicap" will result if the competitor is denied
access. 83 In sum, a court will likely only fmd unilaterally-owned
"essential facilities" if there is a showing that they involve "natural
monopolies, facilities whose duplication is forbidden by law, and perhaps
those that are publicly subsidized and thus could not practicably be built
privately. "84
Certain larger networks, backbones or mid-levels, may qualify as
"essential facilities." This determination is always case-specific, and
courts will examine the practical reality as well as the theoretical
possibility of constructing a competing network. As one court stated, just
because Proctor & Gamble can bypass the local telephone loop, it hardly
means that residential consumers have the same ability. 85

79. 948 F.2d at 544.
80. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973).
81. MCI Ccmrnunications Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33
(7th Cir. 1983).
82. ld.
83. Twin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1990)
(finding magazine not essential for sale of nutritional supplements) (citing Hecht v. ProFootball, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979».
84. ld. at 569 (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 68081 (Supp. 1988».
85. California v. F.C.C., 905 F.2d 1217, 123 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Any private network operated by more than one competitor will face
the heightened risk of violating the antitrust laws. If, for example, there
are networks controlled by a few large players in an industry, anticompetitive network decisions may make the network owners liable for
treble damages. Any action that is unjustifiable except as an attempt to
harm competition may be considered an "unreasonable" restraint of trade.
If, for example, several banks combined to create a network for the
purpose of clearing checks, any exclusion of competing banks might
subject the network owners to liability. Similarly, rules that disadvantage
disfavored competitors would also be suspect.
In terms of procedures, traditional constitutional notions of due process
would not apply (absent a fmding of state action). Nonetheless,
fundamental fairness in how the network treats its users would be
necessary to prove "reasonableness." Procedures for resolving network
disputes should be agreed upon, and made known to all users. Moreover,
all similarly situated users should be equally treated. Before a small
competitor is kicked off a network, the owners should be able to establish
that a clearly enunciated, well-publicized rule was violated, that the
offender was given a chance to explain its side of the story, and that
similar previous violations were similarly punished.
By contrast, if a single bank creates such a network, it would have far
greater discretion in treatment of its competitors. Unless it met the strict
standard for "essential facilities," with the key inquiry being whether
competitors could reasonably create a similar network, everything short
of an attempt to monopolize would be permitted. On the other hand,
blatantly anti-competitive action, especially if coupled with benign treatment of other competitors, might reduce the court's tolerance for
unilateral action.

CONCLUSION
At some point, courts will need to resolve the question of how to
apply an eighteenth-century constitution and even older common law to
the communications technology of the twenty-first century.
Only by examining the various functions served by each network, and
the interplay of government regulation and funding, will a logical,
efficient and fair application of timeless principles be possible.
In the best of all worlds, truly private networks would create their own
private constitutions for the betterment of all the network users, and
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complex issues will be addressed well in advance of any crisis. Unfortunately, some private network owners will not make these decisions ahead
of time because they will assume that their discretion will be forever
unlimited. However, like those who die without seeing the need to write
a will, these network owners may fmd that important decisions are
ultimately made by a judge, and that the final dispositions are far different
from those they would have preferred.

